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ABSTRACT 
 
 The contemporary propensity for, and risk of, armed conflict taking 
place among the civilian population has cast a new light on several 
long-standing challenges to the application of international 
humanitarian law (IHL). One is the determination of combatant status 
and, more specifically, the question of when the requirement for the 
combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population may 
exceptionally be relaxed. In addressing this question, the Article re-
examines Additional Protocol I’s Article 44(3) and adopts an 
interpretation thereof that better comports with its object and purpose 
than those previously prevalent. After exposing the limitations of relying 
solely on drafting history to understand the provision’s exception, the 
object and purpose of Article 44(3) are assessed. On that basis, the 
authors proffer “enemy control of battlespace” as the appropriate 
standard for determining situations to which the exception applies. 
Finally, they highlight a number of legal safeguards that promote the 
protection of the civilian population whenever the exception is 
applicable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The notion of combatancy lies at the heart of international 
humanitarian law (IHL). Parties to an armed conflict are obligated by 
customary and treaty law to distinguish between combatants and 
civilians and direct their operations only against the former, except 
when civilians have lost their protection from attack through 
membership in an organized armed group or by directly participating 
in hostilities.1 Combatancy also accords rights and entitlements. 
During an international armed conflict, combatants enjoy immunity 
from prosecution in both domestic and international tribunals for 
activities related to the hostilities that are lawful under IHL,2 most 
notably intentionally killing the enemy and, in some situations, 
launching an attack that is certain to incidentally harm civilians. 
Additionally, combatants are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status, 
and the many protections that attach thereto, upon capture.3  
 While these basic obligations and rights are universally accepted, 
the precise criteria for qualification as a combatant lack clarity. This 
Article zeroes in on the meaning of a single criterion resident in Article 
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1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48, 51 (2) & 
(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see 
also 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW rr. 1, 6 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CIHL STUDY]; INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 27–36, 46 (2009); MICHAEL N. 
SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT r. 1.1.2 (Int’l Inst. of Humanitarian Law 2006). 
2. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(2). 
3. Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 
4A, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III] 
(defining prisoners of war); Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(1). 
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44(3) of Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
The text of the provision is as follows: 
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of 
hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in 
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant 
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided 
that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:  
(a) During each military engagement, and  
(b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a 
military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to 
participate.  
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be 
considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c).4 
 The second sentence of Article 44(3) is noteworthy because it offers 
combatants exceptional relief from the general obligation to 
distinguish themselves. Whether the exception is militarily sensible is 
the subject of heated and long-standing disagreement, with certain 
nonparty states, most notably the United States and Israel, citing the 
provision as, in part, their basis for refusal to ratify the treaty.5 
Although we address the underlying logic of the competing positions in 
passing, it is not our purpose here to relitigate this controversy. 
Rather, our objective is more focused—to elucidate the meaning of the 
determinative phrase “cannot so distinguish” in the context of 
contemporary conflict. 
 Our exploration of the functioning of Article 44(3) is apposite for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the number of states parties to AP I is 
                                                                                                                  
 
4. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3). 
5. See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 
Geneva, Switz., 1974–1977, vol. VI, Summary Records of the Fourth Session Plenary 
Meetings, at 121 ¶ 17 (Fed. Pol. Dep’t Bern, 1978) [hereinafter Official Records] 
(explaining Israel’s vote against the draft rule on grounds that it “was contrary to the 
spirit and to a fundamental principle of humanitarian law”); Message from President 
Ronald Reagan Transmitting Additional Protocol II to the Senate, 100th Cong., Treaty 
Doc. 100-2 (Jan. 29, 1987) (“Another provision [of Additional Protocol I] would grant 
combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy the traditional 
requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise 
comply with the laws of war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and 
other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL 119, ¶ 4.6.1.2 (2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] (noting the 
United States’ objections “to the way [Additional Protocol I] relaxed the requirements for 
obtaining the privileges of combatant status”). 
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slowly but steadily increasing.6 As such, the application of its 
provisions is statistically likely to be more frequent in the future. This 
is of particular importance with respect to those provisions that, like 
the rule in question, arguably do not already amount to customary 
international law that is binding on all states.7  
 Secondly, the relevance of Article 44(3)’s exception to the 
requirement of distinction is on the rise due to the evolving nature of 
warfare. Since the 1970s, decolonization and proxy wars, which were 
the staple of Cold War-era armed conflict, have been replaced in great 
part, albeit not entirely, by asymmetrical conflicts pitting military 
superpowers like the United States and its partners against 
significantly weaker forces and localized armed groups with limited 
resources and military strength, as was the case in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq.8 During such insurgencies or other modes of asymmetrical 
warfare, the forces of the weaker party are often based in, and conduct 
hostilities among, the civilian population. The exception ameliorates 
the difficulty of effectively fighting an asymmetrically advantaged 
opponent in such circumstances by countenancing the suspension of 
the obligation to distinguish oneself when the conditions of the 
provision are met.  
 Urbanization will exacerbate the phenomenon of war among the 
civilian population. While in 1974 only 1.5 billion people lived in cities, 
the corresponding figure for 2018 is estimated at 4.2 billion—nearly a 
threefold increase.9 To place the trend in context, by the middle of this 
century, almost 70 percent of the global population will live in cities.10 
In that war usually follows people, the flight to cities has brought with 
it a growing incidence of urban warfare.11 Crucially, asymmetrically 
weaker opponents will often find it strategically and operationally 
advantageous to exploit the urban environment in order to maintain a 
realistic prospect of victory over their militarily more powerful 
                                                                                                                  
 
6. See States Party to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other 
Related Treaties, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (June 4, 2018), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl [https://perma.cc/93UJ-Y5HB] (archived Sept. 10, 2018). 
7. For the customary status of Article 44 of Additional Protocol I, see infra text 
accompanying notes 21–24. 
8. See generally MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS (2d ed. 2007) (analyzing the 
patterns of war and violence and comparing recent wars with those in the past).  
9. UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 
2018 REVISION—KEY FACTS 2, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/ [https://perma.cc/C7JT-
NJXF] (archived Sept. 10, 2018). 
10. UN DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 
2014 REVISION—HIGHLIGHTS 7, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/publications/files/wup2014 
-highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/93C8-XT2N] (archived Sept. 10, 2018).  
11. Cf. David Campbell et al., Introduction to Urbicide: The Killing of Cities?, 
10(2) THEORY & EVENT 1, 1 (“As traditional wars between nation states conducted in 
open terrain have become objects of relative curiosity, so the informal, ‘asymmetric’ or 
‘new’ wars that centre on localized struggles over strategic urban sites have become the 
norm.”).  
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enemies.12 In light of these and other realities of modern combat, 
situations falling within the purview of the “cannot so distinguish” 
exception will become ever more common. 
 Thirdly, in light of remarkable advances in intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and the means to 
communicate the information attained thereby, concealment and 
deception have become pervasive features of modern-day combat 
operations.13 Appearing to be a civilian, or otherwise frustrating the 
enemy’s ability to distinguish civilians from combatants, offers 
meaningful tactical advantages, both in terms of avoiding 
identification by the enemy and mounting one’s own offensive 
operations. Indeed, the tactical advantages of muddying enemy 
targeting by operating from within the civilian population have been 
tragically illustrated during recent conflicts in which insurgents have 
prevented the civilian population from fleeing cities where combat is 
expected.14 It is thus necessary to understand where the legal limits of 
such tactics lie beyond the basic prohibition of perfidy, which bans the 
feigning of civilian or other protected status in order to kill, wound, or 
capture the enemy.15 The scope of Article 44(3) is central to such limits. 
 To lay the foundation for assessing application of the phrase 
“cannot so distinguish” in modern warfare, Part II of the Article 
introduces IHL’s extant standards for combatancy. The piece then 
turns to the travaux préparatoires of Article 44(3) in Part III. This 
analysis exposes the limitations of relying solely on the provision’s 
drafting history to understand the notion. Therefore, and consistent 
with the interpretive approach set forth in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties,16 we look to the object and purpose of Article 44(3) 
to inform our examination in Part IV. Armed with an understanding of 
this telos of the provision, in Part V of the Article we proffer “enemy 
control of battlespace” as the appropriate standard for determining 
when the requirement to distinguish oneself may exceptionally be 
attenuated. Finally, Part VI highlights a number of legal safeguards 
that mitigate the risk associated with use of enemy control of the 
                                                                                                                  
 
12. See IVAN ARREGUÍN-TOFT, HOW THE WEAK WIN WARS: A THEORY OF 
ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 12–13 (2005). 
13. See SCOTT GERWEHR & RUSSELL W. GLENN, THE ART OF DARKNESS: 
DECEPTION AND URBAN OPERATIONS 37–38 (2000). 
14. See, e.g., ICRC & INTERACTION, OUTCOME REPORT: WHEN WAR MOVES TO 
CITIES: PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN URBAN AREAS 2 (2017) [hereinafter WHEN WAR 
MOVES TO CITIES], https://reliefweb.int/report/world/when-war-moves-cities-protection-
civilians-urban-areas-outcome-report-may-2017 (illustrating some examples of urban 
warfare and its impact on civilians). 
15. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 37(1) (setting out the prohibition 
of perfidy and listing examples of prohibited conduct). 
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331.  
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battlespace vis-à-vis Article 44(3)’s reference to situations in which 
combatants “cannot so distinguish” themselves. 
 Two cautionary notes are in order, lest the analysis that follows 
be understood in an overbroad manner. First, the discussion applies 
only to international armed conflict. This is because the concept of 
combatancy is limited to armed conflicts that are international in 
character; there is no equivalent to combatant status in non-
international armed conflicts.17 Second, the analysis is confined to 
conflicts between states parties to AP I (and, possibly, those involving 
parties to the conflict that accept and apply the Protocol on an ad hoc 
basis18). Although a number of the Protocol’s provisions either reflect 
or have acquired the force of customary law,19 that is not the case with 
all of the instrument’s rules.20  
 In this regard, the customary status of Article 44 is nuanced. Most 
of its components are considered reflective of customary international 
law. This includes the first sentence of paragraph 3, which prescribes 
that combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population in order to enjoy the benefits of combatancy.21 In particular, 
that sentence has been recognized by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) as an expression of customary international 
                                                                                                                  
 
17. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 41 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES]; Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79, 85 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013); GARY D. 
SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 201 
(2d ed. 2016). 
18. Cf. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 96(2). 
19. For an early observation to this effect, see Yoram Dinstein, The Application 
of Customary International Law Concerning Armed Conflicts in the National Legal 
Order, in NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29, 34 
(Michael Bothe et al. eds., 1990) (“[I]n my assessment, the great majority of the norms 
of the Protocol—perhaps as many as 85%—qualify as declaratory or non-
controversial[.]”). 
20. See, e.g., John Bellinger & William James Haynes, A US Government 
Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 446 (2007) (“Additional 
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions contain far-reaching provisions, but States 
did not at the time of their adoption believe that all of those instruments’ provisions 
reflected rules that already had crystallized into customary international law; indeed, 
many provisions were considered ground-breaking and gap-filling at the time.”). 
21. See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, 
Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, PROGRAM ON 
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH: HARVARD UNIVERSITY: OCCASIONAL 
PAPER SERIES, Winter 2005, at 64–65 (‘The first sentence of Article 44(3) of Additional 
Protocol I is essentially a statement of customary international law[.]”). But see Anthony 
Rogers, Combatant Status, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 116 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 
2007) (“Under customary law . . . if a person qualifies as a prisoner of war, he must be 
accorded prisoner-of-war status even if he has not distinguished himself from the civilian 
population.”).  
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law.22 However, this is not the case with the second sentence of the 
same paragraph, which relaxes the requirement.23 On the contrary, a 
number of nonparty states have publicly objected to the exception.24 
Nonetheless, it remains valid law for states parties to the Protocol and 
will be examined here as such. 
II. COMBATANT STATUS: THE LEX SCRIPTA 
 The legal status of fighters engaged in hostilities is determined by 
the regulation of combatant status under IHL. As with many other IHL 
issues, the relevant rules constitute an attempt to craft a balance 
between military and humanitarian considerations.25 On the one hand, 
the legal designation of combatants serves to allow armed forces 
involved in an international armed conflict to take those actions that 
are necessary to bring about their opponent’s defeat (principle of 
military necessity). This is accomplished by affording members of the 
armed forces combatant immunity for certain acts that would be 
unlawful but for the fact that they were undertaken during an armed 
conflict. On the other hand, by carving out a category of persons who 
alone are liable to be targeted lawfully, IHL also serves the 
countervailing goal of protecting the lives and health of those who do 
not directly participate in hostilities (principle of humanity).26 
Affording combatants the benefits of POW status once they are hors de 
combat due to surrender or capture, and thus no longer able to fight, 
also reflects the humanitarian underpinning of IHL.27 
 The interaction of these two foundational principles finds its most 
fundamental expression in the rule of distinction, today enshrined in 
                                                                                                                  
 
22. ICRC CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at 384. 
23. Cf. id. at 387–89.  
24. See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, at 119 ¶ 4.6.1.2 (“The 
United States has objected to the way these changes relaxed the requirements for 
obtaining the privileges of combatant status, and did not ratify AP I, in large part, 
because of them.”); Official Records, supra note 5, at 121 ¶ 17 (Israel explaining its vote 
against the draft rule on grounds that it “was contrary to the spirit and to a fundamental 
principle of humanitarian law”). 
25. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International 
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 798–801 
(2010) (“IHL represents a carefully thought out balance between the principles of 
military necessity and humanity. Every one of its rules constitutes a dialectical 
compromise between these two opposing forces.”). 
26. See JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 61–62 (1985) (discussing the fundamental principles of 
international humanitarian law). 
27. See ICRC CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at 166–67 (“Respect for and protection 
of persons who are in the power of an adverse party is a cornerstone of international 
humanitarian law[.]”). 
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Article 48 of AP I and generally considered as reflecting customary 
international law.28 The rule requires parties to the conflict to “at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants.”29 
Since the definition of civilians is in the negative, that is, civilians are 
those who are not combatants,30 the meaning of the term “combatant” 
is the key to application of the rule, as well as its progeny, such as the 
prohibition on attacking civilians or intentionally terrorizing them.31  
 The classic definition of a combatant was first articulated with 
binding force32 in Article 1 of the Regulations annexed to the 1899 
Hague Convention II,33 which was subsequently incorporated verbatim 
into the first article of the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention 
IV of 1907.34 The latter, which has long been deemed to reflect 
customary international law,35 provided, 
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia 
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 
3. To carry arms openly; and 
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
                                                                                                                  
 
28. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶¶ 78–79 (July 8); Western Front, Aerial Bombardment 
and Related Claims: Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9–13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, Partial Award, 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (Dec. 19, 2005) 26 R.I.A.A. 291, ¶¶ 93–95; ICRC 
CIHL STUDY, supra note 1, at rr. 1, 7.  
29. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 48. 
30. Id. art. 50(1). 
31. Id. art. 51(2). 
32. See also PROJECT OF AN INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION CONCERNING THE 
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR (1874), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 23, 24 
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) (containing the first international 
attempt to define combatant status). However, the Brussels Declaration was never 
ratified and thus it did not acquire the force of a binding agreement. See KUBO MAČÁK, 
INTERNATIONALIZED ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133–35 (2018) 
(discussing the relevance of the Brussels Declaration for the historical development of 
combatant status under IHL).  
33. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex 
on Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, July 29, 1899, 
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900). 
34. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to 
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 1, Oct. 
18, 1907, 205 C.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
35. See, e.g., Trial of the Major War Criminals, Judgment, International Military 
Tribunal, 253–54, Sept. 30, 1946; Judgment of 4 November 1948, International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, November 4, 1948 (IMTFE), reproduced in THE TOKYO WAR 
CRIMES TRIAL vol. 22, at 48, 291 (R. John Pritchard & Sonia M. Zaide eds., 1981).  
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In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part 
of it, they are included under the denomination “army.”36 
 The 1949 Geneva Conventions adopted these four conditions, 
while making the criteria for combatant status even more stringent. 
Article 4A of Geneva Convention III (GC III), which lists the categories 
of persons who, if captured by the enemy, are to be accorded POW 
status, is universally considered as setting forth the contemporary 
criteria for combatant status under customary international law.37 It 
provides, in relevant part: 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons 
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of 
the enemy: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of 
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including 
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict 
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is 
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such 
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or 
an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
 Like its Hague Conventions counterparts, Article 4A of GC III 
distinguishes between regular and irregular armed forces. The latter 
                                                                                                                  
 
36. Hague Regulations, supra note 34, art. 1. 
37. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1677, at 515 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 
1987) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY] (acknowledging that 
combatant status was not explicitly affirmed by Article 4A GC III, but considering it 
implicitly included in the recognition of POW status); EMILY CRAWFORD, IDENTIFYING 
THE ENEMY: CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICT 17 (2015) (“Article 43 of 
Protocol 1 and Article 4A of the Third Geneva Convention outline who is entitled to POW 
status and, by extension, combatant status.”); Sean Watts, Who Is a Prisoner of War?, in 
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 890, ¶ 2 (Andrew Clapham, Paola 
Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015) (noting that art. 4A GC III “has been perceived as a 
merger of sorts between conditions for POW status and conditions expected of 
combatants generally”); NOAM ZAMIR, CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE LEGAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS 136 
(2017) (considering that the original purpose of art. 4A GC III was to determine who was 
entitled to POW status and consequently to serve as a definition of a combatant). 
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are subject to four conditions listed in the second subparagraph, 
including that of having a “fixed distinctive sign,”38 a requirement 
satisfied by wear of a uniform, and of carrying their weapons openly.39 
It is these two requirements that Article 44(3) of AP I relaxes by means 
of its “cannot so distinguish” text. 
 Experts in the field take differing views on whether the four 
conditions implicitly apply to members of the armed forces, including 
members of militia or volunteer corps forming part of the armed forces, 
such that their failure to comply with them would deprive the 
individuals concerned of the benefits of combatant status. Proponents 
of their implicit application, including one of the authors, find support 
in some case law, such as the Privy Council’s 1968 judgement in 
Mohamed Ali et al. v. Public Prosecutor, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1942 Ex Parte Quirin decision.40 Those taking the opposite view, 
including the other author, point to the plain wording of the provision 
and the fact that the conditions textually modify only that part of the 
Article dealing with irregular forces, as confirmed by an examination 
of the travaux of GC III.41  
 Nonetheless, this debate need not detain us, for AP I sets forth 
separate conditions for parties to a conflict in which the instrument 
applies. Article 43(2) stipulates that all members of armed forces other 
than medical or religious personnel are combatants, thereby 
dispensing with the clear distinction between regular and irregular 
                                                                                                                  
 
38. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4A(2)(b). 
39. Id. art. 4A(2)(c). 
40. See Ex parte Quirin et al., 317 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1942) (“Our Government, by 
thus defining lawful belligerents entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, has 
recognized that there is a class of unlawful belligerents not entitled to that privilege, 
including those who though combatants do not wear ‘fixed and distinctive emblems’.”); 
Mohamed Ali et al. v. Public Prosecutor (1968), [1969] AC 430, 449 (holding that 
belonging to the armed forces does not suffice for an entitlement to receive prisoner of 
war status); see also, e.g., DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 17, at 50–51; 
Ian Brownlie, Decisions of British Courts During 1968 Involving Questions of Public or 
Private International Law, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 217, 238–39 (1969); Gerald Draper, The 
Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 173, 
182 n.1 (1971) (“[M]embership of armed forces is not enough to establish lawful 
combatancy, unless members operate openly in combat in such capacity[.]”); W. Thomas 
Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants under the 
International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 39, 
74 (1977) (discussing the application of the POW conditions to regular combatants). But 
see In re von Lewinski (called von Manstein), 16 I.L.R. 509, 515–16 (1949) (British 
Military Court at Hamburg) (holding that “regular soldiers” did not have to meet the 
four requirements in order to qualify as combatants). 
41. See, e.g., ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 328 (1976) 
(“[B]oth in view of the wording and the legislative history of article 4 it cannot be a priori 
concluded that the four requirements are constitutive conditions for prisoner-of-war 
status with respect to regular forces[.]”); MAČÁK, supra note 32, at 166–69; W. Hays 
Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 493, 509–
10 (2003); Watts, supra note 37, at 894. 
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forces found in its predecessors.42 Pursuant to Article 44(3) (quoted in 
full above), combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population when conducting attacks or engaging in military operations 
that are preparatory to an attack. In special situations (discussed at 
greater length below), this requirement is somewhat relaxed, meaning 
in particular that the beneficiaries of the exception do not have to wear 
uniforms or other distinguishing garb or emblems. However, they must 
still carry their weapons openly while engaged in attacks and during a 
defined period before such attacks are launched.43 Moreover, Article 
44(7) stipulates that despite the exception, Article 44 “is not intended 
to change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to the 
wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, 
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict.”44  
 Combatants who are captured during a conflict to which the 
Protocol applies forfeit their POW status if they fail to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population to the extent required by 
Article 44(3),45 although they are nevertheless entitled to “protections 
equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war.”46 
Moreover, even though they may be dressed as civilians, and despite 
the fact that the reason they may have been so dressed is to enhance 
their survivability in the battlespace, their conduct in failing to wear 
distinctive clothing or emblems and hiding their weapons until 
deployment to an attack does not amount to perfidy.47 
                                                                                                                  
 
42. See ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1672, at 511–13 
(explaining the modern dilution of the preexisting distinction between regular and 
irregular forces); MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL J. PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES 
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS 
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 236–38 (1982); HEATHER A. 
WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION 
MOVEMENTS 173–78 (1988) (outlining the nuances of distinguishing between regular and 
irregular forces). 
43. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3) (“Recognizing . . . that there 
are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of hostilities an armed 
combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, 
provided that . . . he carries his arms openly[.]”). 
44. Id. art. 44(7). 
45. Id. art. 44(3) (noting that “he shall retain his status as a combatant” if the 
requirements of the exception are satisfied) (emphasis added).  
46. Id. art. 44(4). For more on the treatment of such individuals despite their loss 
of POW status, see ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1719, at 538; 
BOTHE ET AL., supra note 42, at 289–90. 
47. See id. art. 44(3) (“Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph 
shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1(c).”); 
see also id. art. 37(1)(c) (listing “the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status” as an 
example of perfidy). 
 
1364      VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 51:1353 
III. TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
 A product of extensive negotiations during the 1974–77 
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, Article 44(3) is hardly an example 
of concision and brevity. Revealingly, opinions regarding its text began 
to differ soon after it had been tentatively approved.48 As a pars pro 
toto example, while the delegate of Ivory Coast lauded the future 
Article 44(3) as “crystal clear and requir[ing] no interpretation,”49 the 
Spanish representative saw it as “somewhat heterogeneous, sometimes 
contradictory, and not altogether clear.”50 
 The central question for the present purposes is the appropriate 
interpretation of the second sentence of Article 44(3) in the context of 
contemporary warfare. In this regard, the drafting history of the 
Protocol is inconclusive. Not all of the delegations actively supported 
the provision; ultimately, there were seventy-three votes for Article 44, 
one against, and twenty-one abstentions.51 More to the point, the 
United Kingdom perceptively opined that “any failure to distinguish 
between combatants and civilians could only put the latter at risk. 
That risk might well become unacceptable unless a satisfactory 
interpretation could be given to [the provision].”52 The crucial 
endeavor, therefore, lay in identifying situations qualifying as ones in 
which combatants “cannot so distinguish” themselves.  
 Examination of the instrument’s travaux reveals that delegations 
that did not oppose adoption of the provision in Geneva broadly fell into 
three categories vis-à-vis its scope of application. Firstly, many 
Western states insisted that the future Article 44(3) would apply only 
in occupied territories.53 Secondly, some states considered its 
application to also extend to wars of national liberation as defined in 
Article 1(4) of AP I.54 The remaining states typically praised the 
adoption of the provision without limiting its application to any specific 
situation.55  
 Upon ratification of the Protocol, many states that had aligned 
themselves with one of the two more restrictive positions issued 
interpretive declarations confirming their understanding of the 
                                                                                                                  
 
48. See generally Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 156–88 (providing 
countries’ explanations for voting for or against the draft article).  
49. Id. at 171 ¶ 12 (Ivory Coast). 
50. Id. at 162 ¶ 41 (Spain). 
51. Id. at 121. 
52. Id. at 132 ¶ 73 (United Kingdom). 
53. See, e.g., id. at 157 ¶ 12 (United Kingdom), 167 ¶ 63 (Germany), 170 ¶ 7 
(Greece), 172 ¶ 19 (France), 176 ¶ 39 (Canada), 179 ¶ 53 (United States), 186 ¶ 83 (New 
Zealand). 
54. See, e.g., id. at 159 ¶ 24 (Norway), 166 ¶ 59 (Argentina), 174 ¶ 28 (Sweden). 
55. See, e.g., id. at 159–60 ¶¶ 26–27 (Egypt), 161 ¶ 36 (Syria), 161 ¶ 39 (South 
Korea), 162 ¶ 42 (India).  
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applicative scope of the provision.56 Although there was some 
movement between the categories following the instrument’s 
adoption,57 the three views continued to be represented among the 
states parties. This implies that, at the very minimum, the provision 
applies to situations of occupation because such cases form the lowest 
common denominator on which all states parties to the Protocol seem 
to be in agreement.58 For instance, provided that the situationally 
specific conditions stipulated in Article 44(3) had been met, it would 
apply to Russian occupied territories during the international armed 
conflict in 2008 between Georgia and Russia59 as well as to the ongoing 
occupation of Crimea by Russia in its international armed conflict with 
Ukraine.60  
 However, belligerent occupation as the least common denominator 
approach deriving from analysis of the travaux cannot be considered 
conclusive with respect to the provision’s interpretation. Chiefly, this 
                                                                                                                  
 
56. For instance, Australia issued a declaration to the effect that “the situation 
described in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can exist only in occupied territory or in 
armed conflicts covered by paragraph 4 of Article 1.” Treaties, States Parties and 
Commentaries, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ 
ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=10312B4E9047086EC1
256402003FB253 (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W2S8-GUM7] (archived 
Sept. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Australia Declaration]; see also Julie Gaudreau, The 
Reservations to the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of 
War Victims, 849 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 143, 152–53 (2003) (referring to ten such 
declarations or reservations).  
57. For example, the United Kingdom modified its position to the extent that “the 
situation in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can only exist in occupied territory or in 
armed conflicts covered by paragraph 4 of Article 1” (wars of national liberation). See 
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?Open 
Document (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/82RN-G83L] (archived Sept. 12, 
2018) (emphasis added). 
58. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(2)(a) (providing that for the 
purposes of treaty interpretation, the relevant context also comprises “any agreement 
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty”). In this regard, see MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 
1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 430 ¶ 18 (2009) (noting that “the 
term ‘agreement’ [in Article 31(2)(a) VCLT] is clearly wider and covers any contractual 
instrument, in particular also agreements not in written form”). 
59. See 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE 
CONFLICT IN GEORGIA REPORT 311 (2009) (considering that the law of occupation was 
applicable to certain parts of Georgia under Russian control); Military Occupation of 
Georgia by Russia, GENEVA ACAD. (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/ 
military-occupation-of-georgia-by-russia#collapse2accord [https://perma.cc/5S5S-9KHJ] 
(archived Nov. 3, 2018) (overview of the Georgian-Russia conflict). 
60. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2016, at ¶ 158, www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/ 
161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8L7-DTCZ] (archived Sept. 10, 2018) 
(considering that “the situation within the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol factually 
amounts to an on-going state of occupation”). 
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is because a limited consensus on the most restrictive interpretation of 
a rule by the drafters should not be confused with agreement by 
adherents of more permissive interpretations to abandon their views 
in order to reach consensus.61 All that can be said is that the most 
restrictive interpretation appeared to be acceptable to all drafters.  
IV. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE EXCEPTION 
 With respect to the drafters’ focus on occupation, it is essential to 
point out that the travaux are preparatory works of a treaty. According 
to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 
which is generally considered reflective of customary law, preparatory 
work is a “supplementary means of interpretation,” one that acquires 
valence only after the primary means of interpretation have failed to 
provide a clear and reasonable meaning of the provision in question.62 
Accordingly, drafting history, while informative in itself, is of only 
secondary value in the interpretation of treaties.  
 By contrast, Article 31 of the VCLT sets forth the determinative 
interpretive mechanism: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”63 Any 
interpretation of Article 44(3) accordingly must consider its underlying 
“object and purpose.”64 Although the usual order in which the methods 
of interpretation provided for by the VCLT are employed begins with 
the ordinary meaning of the terms,65 there is no requirement to do so 
and it is rather understood that they “are all of equal value; none are 
of an inferior character.”66 In the present case, it is particularly helpful 
to begin with the object and purpose of the provision in question.  
 Unusually, the telos of the provision is set forth expressly in its 
opening sentence—“to promote the protection of the civilian population 
from the effects of hostilities.”67 At first glance, it might appear that 
                                                                                                                  
 
61. But see Frits Kalshoven, The Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 
1974–1977, in FRITS KALSHOVEN, REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF WAR: COLLECTED ESSAYS 
181, 202 (2007) (suggesting that at the conference “there was a marked unity of opinion 
that the situations envisaged in the second sentence of paragraph 3 can arise solely in 
occupied territory and in the case of wars of national liberation”) (emphasis added). 
Kalshoven’s suggestion overstates the point given that many delegations did not 
subscribe to either of the two more restrictive views. See supra sources cited in note 55. 
62. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 32. 
63. Id. art. 31(1). 
64. Id.  
65. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 187 (2007) 
(“One naturally begins with the text . . . .”). 
66. VILLIGER, supra note 58, at 435. 
67. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3). 
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this goal is incongruous with any relaxation of the obligation to 
distinguish oneself. In that vein, it has been argued that allowing some 
armed participants to dispense with the obligation, even for a limited 
period of time, “seriously undermine[s] the principle which is so 
important for the protection of the civilian population, namely the 
presumption that apparently unarmed persons in civilian clothes pose 
no threat and should not be attacked[.]”68 This line of argumentation 
suggests that the attenuation of the principle of distinction embodied 
in Article 44(3) reduced or even “effectively nullif[ied]” the legal 
protection for civilians.69 As Professor Geoffrey Corn has argued, the 
provision supposedly diluted  
one of the most important quid pro quos of humanitarian law: in exchange for 
making yourself more easily distinguishable from the civilian population (and as 
a result facilitating the ability of an enemy to lawfully attack you), the law 
granted you the benefit of POW status with its accordant combatant immunity.70 
 In our view, these assertions present an incomplete picture of the 
provision and its legal effects. It must be borne in mind that the 
threshold for the applicability of the exception in the second sentence 
of Article 44(3) is particularly high. It requires that the only option the 
potential beneficiaries have to continue fighting, is to dispense, to a 
degree, with distinguishing themselves, in line with the ordinary 
rules.71 Therefore, the actual choice in the situations in question is not 
as simple as a legal-policy preference for combatants being easily 
distinguishable from the civilian population or not. Instead, the crucial 
question is how to treat, as a matter of law, the consequences of the 
fact that the combatants in question are unable to distinguish 
themselves if they wish to continue fighting. In other words, the choice 
is between exceptionally permitting this mode of combat in limited 
circumstances—and thus keeping those who engage in it within the 
bounds of the law—and labelling them as persons operating in 
violation of the requirements of IHL.  
 This being so, there is an even more fundamental quid pro quo 
lying at the core of IHL than that highlighted by Professor Corn, that 
is, the premise that by bestowing a degree of legal protection on the 
combatants in question by recognizing the military necessity in limited 
circumstances of relaxing the distinction requirement, the law 
                                                                                                                  
 
68. M.H.F. Clarke, T. Glynn & A.P.V. Rogers, Combatant and Prisoner of War 
Status, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECTS OF THE 1977 GENEVA 
PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION 120 (Michael A. Meyer ed., 1989). 
69. CRAWFORD, supra note 37, at 44. 
70. Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer 
Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 274 (2011). 
71. See infra text accompanying notes 86–91. 
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incentivizes them to abide by IHL generally.72 The inclusiveness of the 
law exerts a powerful pull dynamic that enables and strengthens 
overall compliance. This was recognized by a number of delegations in 
Geneva, as illustrated by a Norwegian delegate who noted that the 
beneficiaries of the future Article 44(3) would thereby “be motivated to 
ensure the application of international humanitarian law,”73 which 
“would in turn lead to a better protection of all war victims, and in 
particular of the civilian population.”74 As the ICRC Commentary to 
the provision explains, 
[g]uerilla fighters will not simply disappear by putting them outside the law 
applicable in armed conflict, on the basis that they are incapable of complying 
with the traditional rules of such law. Neither would this encourage them to at 
least comply with those rules which they are in a position to comply with, as this 
would not benefit them in any way.75 
 Seen from this perspective, it becomes clear why the availability 
of combatant status for persons who take advantage of Article 44(3)’s 
exception to the requirement of distinction can actually contribute to 
the protection of the civilian population. By providing these fighters 
with legal status and its attendant benefits, such as combatant 
immunity and formal POW status, the law operates to encourage them 
to respect and protect the civilian population.76 This is because their 
incentive to comply with the law will be reduced if their legal status 
lies beyond the accepted boundaries of the law, thus making them 
liable to prosecution for acts for which they would otherwise enjoy 
combatant immunity, such as attacking the enemy and enemy military 
objectives.  
 Faced with a choice between the Article 44(3) exception possibly 
reducing civilian protection on the one hand and de-incentivizing 
compliance with IHL in the absence of the exception on the other, a 
teleological interpretation of the provision requires endorsing the 
former, even if it may at first appear counterintuitive. But the question 
remains, what interpretive standard best advances the telos of 
optimizing protection of the civilian population? 
  
                                                                                                                  
 
72. See, e.g., Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, 
in 59 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 46 (1978). See generally Steve Nabors, A Right to 
Fight: The Belligerent’s Privilege, in RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE 23 
(Charles Sampford, Spencer Zifcak & Derya Aydin Okur eds., 2015). 
73. Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 158 ¶ 18. 
74. Id. (emphasis added). 
75. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1684 at 521. 
76. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 1; Geneva Convention III,  supra 
note 3, art. 1. 
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V. ENEMY CONTROL OF BATTLESPACE  
 The evolution of warfare over the four decades since the adoption 
of the Protocol, in particular the regular conduct of hostilities among 
the civilian population, requires a reassessment of the terms of Article 
44(3) in light of its object and purpose of “promot[ing] the protection of 
the civilian population from the effects of hostilities.” Armed with this 
telos, it is possible to shape a contemporary approach to the exception. 
 Which potential understandings are legally viable falls to be 
determined by reference to the aforementioned canons of 
interpretation. As noted, the interpretive process starts with an 
examination of the specific text of the relevant terms of the treaty in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning.77 A possible initial obstacle in 
this regard is the text at the beginning of Article 44(3)’s sentence in 
question—“Recognizing . . . that there are situations in armed 
conflicts.”78 It could be objected that the word “recognizing” indicates 
that the normative content of the following text is limited to situations 
that pre-existed the adoption of the provision, and thus were within 
the contemplation of the drafters.  
 However, it is difficult to reconcile such an objection with the 
prevailing evolutive approach to the interpretation of AP I. The 
approach was reflected in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s 
modern construction of the so-called Martens Clause, which is 
enshrined in Article 1 of the Protocol,79 when the ICJ addressed “the 
rapid evolution of military technology.”80 Similarly, in the context of a 
well-known debate over whether computer data qualifies as a military 
objective under Article 52(2) of AP I, both sides notably accepted that 
the provision is subject to dynamic interpretation, even though they 
differed on the conclusion to which such interpretation led.81  
 The ICJ also employed the evolutive approach in its Navigational 
Rights judgment. There, the court noted: 
                                                                                                                  
 
77. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(1). 
78. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3) (emphasis added). 
79. See id. art. 1(2) (“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other 
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from 
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”). The clause was 
first set forth in the 1899 Hague Convention II, supra note 33, pmbl., and later replicated 
in the 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 34, pmbl. 
80. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 ¶ 78 (July 8). 
81. Compare Kubo Mačák, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting 
Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law, 48 ISR. L. REV. 55, 
70–71 (2015), with Michael N. Schmitt, The Notion of ‘Objects’ During Cyber Operations: 
A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 ISR. L. REV. 81, 94–95 
(2015). 
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where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily 
having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, 
and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is “of 
continuing duration”, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have 
intended those terms to have an evolving meaning. 82 
 
 Self-evidently, AP I is a treaty of indeterminate duration and the 
key terms in Article 44(3) (“situations,” “nature of the hostilities,” and 
“military deployment”) are of a generic nature. By the court’s approach, 
therefore, it is apposite to read the provision in a manner that permits 
its adaptation to contemporary conflict.83 It cannot be otherwise, for 
law must remain responsive to the realities of combat in order to serve 
its function of balancing military necessity and humanitarian 
concerns. 
 Since the phrase “situations in armed conflicts” is adaptive to the 
context in which it is to be applied, the challenge is to identify those 
situations in modern warfare (in addition to situations of belligerent 
occupation discussed above) that may qualify as ones in which, “owing 
to the nature of the hostilities,” combatants “cannot” distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population.84 A well-known contemporary 
critic of the Additional Protocol decried the modal verb “cannot” as “a 
masterstroke of amoral draftsmanship.”85 Beyond such unfortunate 
hyperbole, though, how is the notion best understood in 2018 in the 
context of protecting the civilian population from the effects of 
hostilities? 
 To begin with, the exemption in the second sentence of Article 
44(3) only applies in special situations, and not, for example, to 
irregular armed forces in general.86 After all, “cannot” implies that the 
individuals in question have no other means of effectively continuing 
to fight than dispensing with the requirement to wear a uniform, 
                                                                                                                  
 
82. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 
Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, 243 ¶ 66 (July 13).  
83. Cf. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of 
Israel, 62(1) PD 507, ¶ 28 (2006) (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 373 
(“[N]ew reality at times requires new interpretation. Rules developed against the 
background of a reality which has changed must take on a dynamic interpretation which 
adapts them, in the framework of accepted interpretational rules, to the new reality.”). 
84. It must be cautioned that the reference to “situations” in Article 44(3) denotes 
specific engagements as distinct from the entire conflict or campaign. Each engagement 
must be judged on its own merits to determine whether the circumstances merit 
application of the relaxed level of distinction provided for in the Article. 
85. Douglas J. Feith, Law in the Service of Terror—The Strange Case of the 
Additional Protocol, 1 NAT’L INT. 36, 47 (1985). 
86. See Kalshoven, supra note 61, at 201. On the distinction between regular and 
irregular forces, see supra Part II. 
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distinctive sign, or other indicia that they are combatants. As the 
United Kingdom’s Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict observes, 
“[t]he special rule is thus limited to those exceptional situations where 
a combatant is truly unable to operate effectively whilst distinguishing 
himself in accordance with the normal requirements.”87  
 Accordingly, the fact that the weaker party could gain a military 
advantage by being temporarily relieved of the duty of distinction does 
not satisfy Article 44(3)’s “cannot” condition precedent. Similarly, it 
does not suffice that relaxation of the duty would help balance any 
operational inequities between the parties to the conflict. Both of these 
interpretations would strip the relief in the second sentence of Article 
44(3) of its exceptional character; the exception would swallow the rule 
during the asymmetrical conflicts that have become so prevalent. 
Indeed, taken to its logical extreme, if the issue was advantaging a 
party to the conflict, the exception would apply in virtually all conflicts 
because it would always afford the combatants to which it applied an 
operational benefit of some sort. Relaxation of the distinction 
requirement to such a degree would manifestly run counter to the 
object and purpose of the provision. 
 Therefore, the test must be much stricter. In that regard, we agree 
with the ICRC’s commentary to Article 44(3), which emphasizes that 
in order for the exception to apply, the balance of power must be “out 
of all proportion in favour of one of the Parties.”88 Such radical 
imbalance means that the weaker party’s combatants cannot 
distinguish themselves while still retaining “a chance of success.”89 
Qualifying situations are those in which the asymmetrically 
disadvantaged belligerent has no remaining alternative but to resort 
to conduct that would otherwise fail to comply with the duty of 
distinction.90 In other words, the exception demands that “the visible 
carrying of arms and distinguishing signs . . . [must] really be 
incompatible with the practicalities of the action (for example, if the 
guerrilla fighters use the population for support or are intermingled 
with it).”91 To comply with the requirement of distinction in the 
situations envisaged would ensure mission failure.  
 This narrow construction explains why many delegations sought 
to limit application of the provision either to wars of national liberation 
or to occupied territories, for in such situations one party to the conflict 
usually not only exercises far greater control over the area in question, 
                                                                                                                  
 
87. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 42 
¶ 4.5.1 (2004) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]. 
88. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1702 at 532 n.50. 
89. Official Records, supra note 5, vol. XV, at 453 ¶ 19 (Report of Committee III). 
90. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 37, ¶ 1702 at 532. 
91. Id. at 530 n.40 (citing Charles Chaumont, La recherche d’un critère pour 
l’intégration de la guérilla au droit international humanitaire contemporain, in 
MÉLANGES OFFERTS À CHARLES ROUSSEAU 50 (1974)). 
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but also typically enjoys superiority in terms of military capability. The 
opposing side has little prospect of prevailing absent some relaxation 
of the requirement to distinguish oneself from the civilian population. 
However, these two situations fall short of optimizing the Article 44(3) 
exception’s goal of enhancing protection of the civilian population. 
 It may be the case that occupation reflects a high level of control 
over territory such that enemy combatants cannot realistically 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. Indeed, occupying 
powers often issue strict security measures that can dramatically 
hinder the ability of enemy fighters to engage in military activities if 
they are readily identifiable as such. For instance, during the 
occupation of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority “de-ba’athified” 
Iraqi society,92 issued orders governing the possession of weapons93 
and public gatherings to which criminal penalties attached,94 and 
created a new Iraqi Army under its control.95 These and other actions 
of the occupying forces severely limited the military practicality of 
insurgent fighters, including the remnants of the former Iraqi Army, 
complying with the requirement of distinction. 
 However, the legal test for occupation does not suffice as 
normative shorthand for the requisite extent of control that is 
necessary for application of the Article 44(3) exception. The applicable 
customary law definition of occupation was set forth in treaty form in 
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: “Territory is considered 
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile 
army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.”96  
 This standard is the subject of some debate, thereby rendering it 
unsuitable to play such an interpretive role. Certain experts are of the 
view that occupation does not necessarily entail that the occupying 
power is actually exercising its authority over the entirety of the 
occupied territory. Rather, it suffices for that power to have the 
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capacity to exert authority over the territory.97 An example would be a 
situation in which forces are moving quickly through enemy territory 
as the enemy is in full retreat. The former could leave troops in place 
to establish sufficient control over areas from which they have 
vanquished the enemy, thereby substituting their authority for that of 
the enemy government. However, because doing so would slow the pace 
of the advance, the decision is made to defer establishing that authority 
in order to press the offensive with all available assets. This was the 
case for a short period as Coalition forces raced north into Iraq in early 
2013. By the aforementioned view as to when occupation commences, 
it is conceivable that certain territory could be considered legally 
occupied, and yet the level of control over the area wielded by the 
offensive force would not be at a level triggering the Article 44(3) 
exception. 
 Other scholars, relying on the ICJ’s judgement in Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo, are of the view that the actual exercise of 
authority in substitution of the enemy’s is necessary before occupation 
ensues as a matter of law.98 Consider a scenario in which the forces of 
a party to the conflict are in military control of an area to such an 
extent that the enemy cannot effectively operate in the open. However, 
the military forces do not supplant the authority of the local regime, 
for instance, by engaging in law enforcement, overseeing operation of 
the judicial system, performing civil administrative duties, and the 
like. In such a case, the area would not be considered occupied in the 
legal sense by those taking this position, but the situation would 
nevertheless meet the requirements for application of Article 44(3)’s 
exception.  
 As noted, some of the Diplomatic Conference delegations included 
wars of national liberation, defined in Article 1(4) of AP I, as situations 
giving rise to the requisite control implied in Article 44(3).99 In our 
view, such a standard would be overbroad, for in a war of national 
liberation the force fighting the government may have the military 
wherewithal necessary to engage in classic operations; indeed, it may 
control significant territory itself. Further, there is nothing inherent in 
a war of liberation, which is defined by reference to the motive for 
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resorting to armed force against the government, that necessarily 
implies the type of control that infuses the Article 44(3) exception. 
 As a practical matter, encompassing wars of national liberation 
within the purview of the exception would in any event have little 
practical effect. Article 1(4) has a very limited scope of application, 
which has led to suggestions that it would “never be applied” and that 
it amounted to “a dead letter.”100 Yet, the concept has recently seen 
some limited revival. In 2015, Switzerland, as the depositary of AP I, 
accepted an undertaking to apply the Geneva Conventions and the 
Protocol that had been issued by the Polisario Front in the context of a 
purported Article 1(4)-type conflict in Western Sahara.101 Although 
this decision was challenged by the government of Morocco as the 
supposed other party to the conflict,102 the events surrounding the 
declaration have arguably breathed new life into Article 1(4).103 
Nevertheless, situations qualifying as “wars of national liberation” in 
the sense of Article 1(4) are extremely rare and likely to remain so. 
 In our view, the best interpretive understanding of the exception, 
especially in the context of the prevalence of war among the civilian 
population, is that it applies only in “enemy-controlled battlespace.” 
The phrase denotes a degree of control that precludes an opponent 
force operating in that battlespace from distinguishing itself except as 
provided for in Article 44(3), at least with any meaningful chance of 
tactical success. Control must rise to the level of physical control by the 
military or other security forces over a relatively well-defined area.  
 These situations are necessarily characterized by a high degree of 
asymmetry between the parties to the conflict. For example, one party 
may exercise control over an urban environment, while the other 
attempts to disrupt and subvert that control. The fact that an armed 
force or other fighters may still operate in the area does not necessarily 
deprive the situation of the degree of control necessary to qualify as 
being under enemy control. But they must not be able to do so openly 
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and cannot meaningfully be able to contest control over the area in 
question absent application of the Article 44(3) exception. Should no 
party exert the requisite control over the battlespace, the exception 
would not apply.104 
 In our estimation, the notion of enemy-controlled battlespace 
more closely approximates the object and purpose of Article 44(3) than 
the unsettled legal standard of occupation or the rare conflict that 
amounts to a war of national liberation. These two situations may be 
characterized by the requisite level of control and thus qualify as 
enemy-controlled, but satisfaction of their legal criteria is neither 
necessary, nor necessarily adequate, for application of the Article 44(3) 
exception. Therefore, the enemy-controlled battlespace standard better 
withstands testing against the teleological underpinning of the 
provision, for it limits the exception to application in only those 
situations in which such an exception is truly necessary.  
VI. LEGAL SAFEGUARDS 
 The goal of protecting the civilian population militates for great 
care in applying the standard of enemy control of the battlespace to the 
requirement of distinction’s Article 44(3) exception. If abused, the 
standard could endanger the civilian population by denying it the 
protection typically attendant to distinction. Lest this concern be 
exaggerated, it is important to highlight a number of safeguards that 
have been built into the provision itself or can be implied from the 
applicable law. They collectively serve to constrain potential 
detrimental effects of applying the provision in modern warfare. 
 First and foremost, the beneficiaries of the exception are not 
entirely relieved of the requirement of distinction. In order not to lose 
combatant status, they still must carry their arms openly during the 
military engagement and “[d]uring such time as [they are] visible to 
the adversary while [they are] engaged in a military deployment 
preceding the launching of an attack in which [they are] to 
participate.”105  
 While the concept of “military engagement” poses little 
difficulty,106 the notion of “military deployment” as used in this context 
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is less clear.107 During the Diplomatic Conference, some delegations 
considered that the latter term applies to the entirety of the tactical 
movement from a hideaway to the point of attack.108 Others argued 
that the concept of military deployment is limited to “the last step in 
the immediate and direct preparation for an attack,” in other words, 
the moment of taking up one’s firing position.109 In our view, this latter 
position is untenable, for it would negate entirely the goal of protecting 
the civilian population. If the law permitted the complete concealment 
of an attacker until the very moment of attack, the presumption that 
animates this part of the law—that “apparently unarmed persons in 
civilian dress do not attack”110—would be eliminated. Thus, only the 
former interpretation of the term military deployment is compatible 
with the object and purpose of the exception. 
 However, the phrasing limits the requirement to carry one’s arms 
openly to such time as the combatants are visible to the adversary. In 
the spirit of compromise that animates the text of this provision, this 
aspect benefits the asymmetrically disadvantaged party. At the time 
of drafting, it was suggested that it includes situations in which the 
individuals concerned are potentially visible by technological means 
such as binoculars and infrared equipment.111 Even viewed from the 
perspective of 1970s technology, that position appears problematic, as 
it makes the requirement dependent upon the adversary’s level of 
technological sophistication, with obvious negative implications for the 
principle of equal application of the law.112  
 From the perspective of contemporary warfare, such an 
interpretation is even less defensible. With modern advances in 
technology, the asymmetrically more powerful party that is in physical 
control of the battlespace normally possesses technological methods 
and means of warfare that render much of the battlespace highly 
transparent. Drones with advanced sensor suites and extended loiter 
capability, high resolution reconnaissance and surveillance satellites, 
airborne communications intercept capabilities, and cyber espionage 
come to mind. In the urban environment, CCTV cameras have the 
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potential to passively surveil nearly every city street. To interpret the 
condition of visibility as including all these means would render the 
limitation meaningless because members of the asymmetrically 
weaker force would have to assume they are constantly visible by the 
adversary, and they therefore would have to carry their arms openly at 
all times.  
 The more defensible interpretation is that the condition should be 
understood as entailing a subjective standard; if combatants know or 
should reasonably know that they are being actively observed by the 
enemy, then the duty to carry their arms openly activates.113 This 
certainly includes observation by the naked eye. It may also cover 
active forms of observation using modern technology, albeit only to the 
extent that the combatants may reasonably infer, with the information 
available to them at the time, that they are presently visible to the 
enemy, which is, at the same time, engaged in active observation. If 
they do not know or should not reasonably conclude that is the case, 
the obligation does not attach. Although this interpretation serves to 
limit the period during which the obligation activates, its import is to 
foster distinction during that time in which it will have its greatest 
protective effect for the civilian population. 
 Secondly, the exception does not allow for a “revolving door” 
phenomenon, whereby persons are only targetable while carrying their 
arms openly in line with the requirements of the provision, but 
considered civilians immune from attack at all other times.114 In fact, 
the opposite is true. The requirements of Article 44(3) do not bear upon 
whether one is a combatant or not; they merely determine whether or 
not that person has committed a breach of IHL by failing to distinguish 
themselves.115 The beneficiaries of the rule thus remain targetable 
irrespective of the exceptional applicability of Article 44(3) at any 
particular time.  
 Admittedly, if a group of such persons are collocated with the 
civilian population, as would be the case in an urban environment, 
their presence represents a substantial risk of collateral civilian 
casualties.116 Still, it must be remembered that in targeting these 
individuals, the adversary must abide by the other applicable rules, 
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including the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks,117 the rule of 
proportionality,118 the duty to exercise constant care to spare the 
civilian population,119 and the requirement to take all feasible 
precautions in attack to minimize incidental civilian injury or death 
and damage to civilian property.120 
 Thirdly, the same is true with respect to the beneficiaries of the 
Article 44(3) exception. The provision does not relieve them of their 
duty to comply with all other applicable obligations under IHL. In 
particular, when conducting military operations, they still have to 
respect the principle of distinction, and thus only direct their 
operations against military objectives.121 Additionally, they are 
equally subject to the general obligation to take “constant care . . . to 
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects” in their 
military operations,122 as well as to the specific obligation to endeavor, 
to the maximum extent feasible, “to remove the civilian population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the 
vicinity of military objectives.”123  
 Consequently, such individuals remain obliged to avoid any 
unnecessary harm to civilians even while operating pursuant to the 
exception. This includes harm that could foreseeably be caused by their 
enemy in response to the nature of the operation undertaken by the 
combatants acting under the exception to the requirement of 
distinction. If, for instance, it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
enemy’s reaction to an ambush in a densely populated area like an 
open-air market would risk extensive loss of civilian life, the 
precautionary rules might require refraining from the attack and 
waiting for another opportunity to act.124  
 Fourthly, the effect of the provision is limited to a single kind of 
deception in armed conflict, namely the pretense of being an unarmed 
civilian in highly asymmetrical situations. For this reason, the closing 
sentence of Article 44(3) clarifies that conduct in accordance with the 
requirements prescribed by that provision shall not be considered as 
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perfidious within the meaning of Article 37(1)(c) of AP I.125 However, 
all other acts designed to mislead the adversary by feigning protection 
under IHL, and then betraying any resulting confidence, would still be 
perfidious and, if they result in the killing, injuring, or capturing of the 
adversary, would qualify as a violation of the prohibition of perfidy.126 
Consider, for example, a situation of armed violence in the urban 
environment with the presence of UN relief agencies. Even if the 
conditions for the applicability of Article 44(3) AP I are met, the 
asymmetrically disadvantaged party would still be prohibited from 
using the distinctive UN emblems in attacking its opponents.127 Such 
conduct would qualify as perfidy128 and might amount to a grave 
breach of the Protocol.129 
 Finally, even if combatants meet the requirements of Article 44(3), 
this only means they retain their combatant status. They nevertheless 
remain liable for prosecution for war crimes. As reflected in Article 85 
of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, the question of prosecution 
for such conduct is separate from the determination of combatant or 
prisoner of war status.130 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The contemporary propensity for, and risk of, armed conflict 
taking place among the civilian population has cast a new light on a 
number of the long-standing challenges to the application of IHL 
during modern warfare. One is the determination of combatant status. 
This Article explored the possibility of reviving AP I’s oft-reviled 
Article 44(3) by adopting an interpretation thereof that better comports 
with the object and purpose of the provision than those previously in 
vogue.  
 Our view is that it is inapposite to conflate the applicability of this 
provision with other self-standing legal tests found in IHL. In 
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particular, and although it is possible that the exceptional 
circumstances to which the Article 44(3) exception applies arise in such 
situations (as some states participating in the Diplomatic Conference 
concluded), the legal tests for the existence of occupation or of a war of 
national liberation do not suffice for determining the applicability of 
Article 44(3). It is possible, for instance, to have a situation during 
occupation or a war of national liberation to which the provision does 
not apply, while it is equally conceivable that the provision would apply 
in scenarios other than these two. 
 Accordingly, we suggest that the appropriate test is one of actual 
control over battlespace. If the enemy maintains a degree of control 
over the physical battlespace that renders a combatant “truly unable 
to operate effectively whilst distinguishing himself in accordance with 
the normal requirements,” then the provision applies.131 This will 
often, although by no means always, be the case during hostilities 
occurring in the proximity of the civilian population, such as urban 
combat, and that are characterized by asymmetrical distribution of 
power, resources, and physical control between the parties. 
 In such limited circumstances, the provision—widely considered 
either obsolete or subsiding into irrelevance—may obtain a fresh lease 
of life. However, it bears recalling that as a non-customary provision of 
AP I, it would only apply to international armed conflicts involving 
states parties to the instrument. Still, with over 170 states having 
ratified the Protocol so far, and with combat occurring among the 
civilian population with appalling frequency, its relevance will only 
increase in the near future. And since nonparties to AP I, notably the 
United States, now regularly fight in coalitions with states that are 
party thereto, commanders and other representatives of the former 
must take into account the manner in which their coalition partners 
are likely to operate.  
 Finally, we caution that the applicability of the exception in 
Article 44(3) does not amount to a “get out of jail free” card for its 
beneficiaries. Far from it, the compromise between military necessity 
and humanitarian considerations that lies at the heart of the provision 
entails a number of important safeguards intended to promote the 
protection of the civilian population in situations to which the 
exception applies. In this regard, it is incumbent on all parties to the 
conflict—the asymmetrically weaker as well as the asymmetrically 
more powerful—to understand that, in the words of Jean de Preaux, 
“by protecting the civilian population they protect themselves.”132 
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